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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 817, FRANKLIN COUNTY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO." U-9897 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
OF FRANKLIN, ESSEX AND HAMILTON COUNTIES, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT H. BALLAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ARTHUR F. GRISHAM, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 817, Franklin 
County (CSEA) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissal 
after hearing of its charge that the Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services of Franklin, Essex and Hamilton Counties 
(BOCES) violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on November 19, 
1987, it discharged Thomas Gillot, the President of CSEA's 
Local 817, in retaliation for his engagement in protected 
activities. 
The circumstances giving rise to this charge may be 
briefly summarized as follows. Gillot, an employee having 
Board U-9897 
approximately three and one-half years of service in the 
capacities of school monitor and teaching assistant, was 
assigned to "time out" rooms at various schools of the BOCES 
where emotionally handicapped students are sent if their 
classroom behavior becomes disruptive. Prior to an incident 
on October 8, 1987, which precipitated Gillot's discharge, he 
had received only positive evaluations and comments 
concerning his work performance. 
Less than one year after his employment by the BOCES, 
Gillot became President of CSEA's Local 817 and served in 
that capacity until his discharge on November 19, 1987. 
While President, Gillot represented the CSEA membership in 
connection with labor-management concerns, including smoking, 
asbestos testing and contract negotiations. The record does 
not contain any evidence that the relationship between CSEA 
and the BOCES was unusually strained or hostile during 
Gillot's tenure, nor was any claim made by CSEA prior to 
Gillot's discharge of anti-union animus or discriminatory 
treatment of union representatives, including Gillot, despite 
the fact that he was transferred to three different school 
locations during his employment.-^/ 
±J Following Gillot's termination, and in the course of the 
proceedings before us, CSEA asserted that the transfers of 
Gillot reflect anti-union animus. However, this allegation 
was not made as an improper practice charge or otherwise at 
the time any of the transfers took place, and it is not part 
of the charge now before us. 
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On October 8, 1987, an incident occurred in the "time 
out" room to which Gillot was assigned, whereby Gillot used 
physical force to compel a student to move to a wastepaper 
basket and spit out a cracker and paper. In doing so, as 
Gillot stated in writing, he "had the student by the shoulder 
and [had his] thumb wrapped on the side of [the student's] 
neck and led the student to the basket to spit out a cracker 
and paper." The student and other students who witnessed the 
incident claimed that Gillot "choked" the student. 
Following the incident, three persons (Dufort, the 
School Principal, Raymo, the teacher in charge, and Leavitt, 
Principal of Special Programs), none of whom were witnesses 
to the incident, conducted an investigation. Dufort 
interviewed students, including the student involved in the 
incident, as did Raymo. Leavitt interviewed Raymo, Dufort, 
the students, and Gillot. In the course of this 
investigation, Raymo prepared a statement, dated October 13, 
1987, describing several additional incidents concerning 
Gillot's alleged deficient conduct while serving as a 
teaching assistant with her students. These incidents had 
apparently not been previously mentioned by her to anyone. 
These three persons recommended to Goodrow, Assistant 
Superintendent of Schools, that Gillot be terminated, a 
recommendation which he and Leavitt communicated to DeSantis, 
Superintendent of Schools. On the basis of this 
Board U-9897 
recommendation, DeSantis notified Gillot, by letter dated 
October 26, 1987, that his termination was to be recommended, 
and he was subsequently discharged. 
2/ 
CSEA asserts that Leavitt and Goodrow were improperly 
motivated in their recommendation to terminate Gillot because 
of his engagement in protected activities as the local 
president. As to Leavitt, CSEA asserts that she told a union 
officer, approximately 18 months prior to the at-issue 
events, that: "I have one thing to say to you. No one 
should become an officer in the union until they have their 
tenure with BOCES." It is further asserted that Leavitt told 
the same employee that she should have brought a suggestion 
that school monitors be paid at the same rate as teaching 
assistants to her, rather than to the "union". CSEA also 
asserts that Leavitt made certain statements to Goodrow and 
DeSantis in support of the recommendation to terminate Gillot 
which were false. The primary support for this claim is that 
Leavitt informed her supervisors that she had consulted an 
expert in "BMAC" (Behavioral Management for the Aggressive 
Client), who had informed her that the procedures utilized by 
Gillot in restraining the student involved in the October 8 
incident was in violation of such procedures, when in fact 
^/Gillot had not completed his probationary term prior to his 
discharge and was accordingly terminated without any hearing 
procedures. 
Board U-9897 
Leavitt did not engage in such consultation, was not familiar 
with BMAC procedures herself, and had no basis for asserting 
that Gillot's handling of the student violated such 
procedures. 
In this regard, CSEA argues that Leavitt's 
recommendation to terminate Gillot was based upon information 
she knew to be untrue, that Goodrow and DeSantis, who 
approved her recommendation, had reason to believe the 
statements were untrue, based, so CSEA asserts, upon 
Leavitt*s reputation for "untruthfulness", 
3/ 
and that the 
approval of Leavitt's recommendation by Goodrow and DeSantis 
must accordingly have been improperly motivated, based, as it 
allegedly was, upon information which they should have 
presumed to be untrue. This argument lacks merit. In the 
first instance, no evidence or offer of proof was made to the 
ALJ that either Goodrow or DeSantis had any knowledge of 
Leavitt's purported reputation. Secondly, regardless of 
Leavitt's reputation, no evidence was offered to support a 
claim that, under the circumstances of this case, Goodrow or 
DeSantis knew or should have known that the statements made 
^/cSEA sought to introduce testimony concerning Leavitt's 
alleged reputation for untruthfulness, which was rejected by 
the ALJ. We find that this rejection was within the proper 
exercise of the ALJ's discretion, particularly where, as 
here, the offer of proof made no claim of knowledge of such 
reputation by the persons responsible for Gillot's 
termination, nor does Leavitt's credibility affect the 
outcome here. 
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by Leavitt were untrue. Indeed, Leavitt's recommendation was 
supported by two other persons, neither of whom is asserted 
to be untruthful or improperly motivated. Finally, even if 
it may be said that Leavitt's basis for recommending Gillot's 
termination was faulty or untrue, the record fails to support 
a determination that such untruthfulness was motivated by 
anti-union animus on Leavitt's part. 
The issue of the propriety of Gillot's behavior is not 
before us. What is at issue is whether CSEA has established, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gillot would not 
have been terminated but for his protected activity. We 
agree with the finding of the ALT that CSEA has failed to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gillot's 
union activity was the real reason for his termination, in 
light of the absence of any evidence of anti-union animus on 
the part of DeSantis and Goodrow, and the serious ambiguity 
of the evidence offered by CSEA in support of the claim that 
Leavitt was improperly motivated. Indeed, Raymo's 
accusations of inappropriate treatment of students by Gillot 
on occasions prior to October 8, although not disclosed prior 
thereto, together with the apparent crediting by Dufort and 
Raymo of the students' version of the October 8 incident, 
under circumstances in which no improper motivation is 
imputed, adequately support the conclusion that CSEA failed 
to meet its burden of proving that Gillot's termination 
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constituted retaliation for protected activities which would 
not have occurred but for those activities. Based upon the 
foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied, and the dismissal of 
the charge by the ALT is affirmed. 
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: July 11, 1989 
Albany, New York 
A/jL^s-u 'JLuz-wu a^^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2B-7/ll/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF DOBBS FERRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and= - -CAS.E-N-0-.- U,-1019 8-
DOBBS FERRY POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (ERNEST R. STOLZER, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
KRUSE & MC NAMARA, ESQS. (RAYMOND G. KRUSE, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) The Dobbs Ferry Police Association, Inc. (Association) 
excepts to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which finds 
it in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by submitting three nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation to compulsory interest arbitration pursuant to §209.4 
of the Act. The three at-issue demands are contained in the 
parties1 expired collective bargaining agreement. The Village of 
Dobbs Ferry (Village) seeks their deletion from a successor 
agreement while the Association seeks their continuation. 
At the outset, while we note that the Association "takes 
exception to the finding that a demand to continue the language 
of [Article VII, Section 2, Article XV, Section 1, and Article 
XXI, Section 1] into a new contract constituted a violation of 
• ^ 
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§209-a.2(b) . . . ", it does not specifically contend that the 
subject matters contained in those Articles are not nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation. Assuming, however, that the 
Association's exceptions are intended to address this issue, we 
^ -fi-nd-^ -.for-.the_-r^ asons--set-.±or±n_in_the-^ LJ_d.ecis±onv-_.tha-t._-each-_o.f-
the three Articles constitutes a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
We further find that, notwithstanding the Association's 
assertion to the contrary, a demand to carry over language from 
an expired agreement is a demand subject to §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act in the same fashion as a demand to add new language would be. 
As the ALJ found, insistence upon continuation at interest 
; arbitration of nonmandatory subjects is as subject to a charge as 
a proposed nonmandatory change would be. 
The exceptions filed by the Association focus not upon 
whether the demands are mandatory or nonmandatory in nature, but 
upon the ALJ's finding that the Association submitted them to 
interest arbitration. The Association argues that these demands 
were not contained in its petition for interest arbitration and 
that in fact the Village submitted them to interest arbitration 
by demanding, in its response to the petition, deletion of the 
articles from the parties' expired agreement. This response was 
submitted simultaneously with the filing of the instant charge, 
which asserts that, notwithstanding the absence of specific 
language in the petition for interest arbitration seeking 
Board - U-10198 
i ^ 
continuation of these articles by the Association, the 
Association nevertheless seeks their inclusion in an interest 
arbitration award. 
The ALT, pursuant to discussion with the parties, proposed 
the following-as a partial statement of facts: 
The Association asserts that while its 
petition is silent on continuation of those 
portions of the parties' expired agreement it 
does not seek to change, it seeks to have the 
arbitration award include those portions. 
While it expects and intends that the award 
will expressly state that those portions of 
the expired agreement will be continued, it 
asserts that if not express, inclusion in the 
award will be implied, apart from any 
continuation of the provisions possible under 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. The Village agrees 
that it expects the award to include not only 
a decision on the changes sought by the 
) parties in the petition and response, but 
also all portions of the expired agreement 
uncontested by the instant charge. Both 
parties agree that the above have been their 
assumptions and intent from the onset of 
negotiations. 
The Association asserts, however, that 
since it is not seeking at arbitration 
affirmative change in the at-issue provisions 
of the expired agreement, it has not carried 
said provisions to arbitration improperly 
within the meaning of the Act. 
Following issuance of this proposed statement of facts to 
the parties, the ALJ directed them to submit any objections, 
modifications or additions to the proposed statement of facts on 
or before October 10, 1988. Within that time frame, the 
Association submitted a "memorandum" which made no reference to 
the AKT's proposed statement of facts, and did not controvert any 
) 
-3 
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of the statements set forth in the ALJ's letter. Indeed, the 
"memorandum" consisted of argument in support of the 
Association's position only. The Association argues before us, 
however, that the memorandum submitted by it is entitled to 
evidentiary—weight- and constitutes—a -controversion—of- the—ALJJLs 
proposed statement of facts. We have carefully scrutinized the 
memorandum submitted by the Association to the ALJ, and are not 
persuaded by the Association's position as stated to us in its 
exceptions. The statement of facts proposed by the ALJ was not 
controverted. It was therefore properly deemed by the ALJ to 
constitute a stipulation of facts and properly formed the basis 
for the ALJ's decision. 
In view of the fact found by the ALJ that the Association 
"seeks to have the arbitration award include [the at-issue 
Articles] of the parties' expired agreement", the ALJ properly 
determined that the Association insisted, as contended by the 
Village, on the submission of the at-issue demands to interest 
arbitration. Thus, the Village's response to the petition, 
together with its filing of the instant charge, constitutes a 
response to the Association's position and, indeed, is in keeping 
with the understanding of both parties that those Articles of 
their expired agreement not modified or deleted will be carried 
forward by virtue of the arbitration award and/or the parties' 
ground rules. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ decision is affirmed and 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Association negotiate in good faith 
by withdrawing said proposals from arbitration. 
DATED: July 11, 1989 
Albany, New York 
r o l d R. Newmefri,Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//2C-7/11/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DONALD 0. SUMMERS, 
Charging Party, 
_ - -_and= JCASE_lKX.-II=JjQ59.8. 
BUFFALO PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 282, 
Respondent. 
DONALD 0. SUMMERS, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Donald O. Summers excepts to the dismissal, as deficient, 
of his improper practice charge against the Buffalo 
) Professional Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 282 (Local 
282), which alleges that Local 282 violated §209-a.2(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to 
refund agency shop fees deducted from his wages in 1987, and 
when it denied his application for membership in Local 282. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the aspect of Summers* 
charge alleging improper failure to refund agency shop fees 
upon the ground of untimeliness.-^/ The charge was filed on 
December 30, 1988, one year after the expiration of the 
calendar year for which Summers asserts a refund was due. The 
•i/pERB's Rules of Procedure §204.1(a)(1) requires that 
charges be filed within four months of the alleged improper 
) practice. 
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Director's decision characterizes Summers' charge as alleging 
the lack of an appropriate agency shop fee refund procedure 
for 1987, and finds that the charge, filed in December 1988, 
was filed more than four months from the time that Summers 
knew- or -should have- known -that-Local 2 8-2- -had—failed- _to- - -
establish a procedure for 1987 in accordance with §208.3(b) of 
the Act.-2/ 
Summers' charge alleges, in part, however, as follows: 
1. In the first week of January 1988 I 
demanded a refund of my agency shop fees 
to which I was entitled for the year 1987. 
2. I have made repeated requests verbally to 
the union president who repeatedly 
informed me the union is working on a 
formula for amount of refund due. 
3. In prior years I have received my refund 
promptly in the amount of 100 percent 
because the union has no formula to date. 
4. My last request for my refund which was 
made in December was referred to Vice 
President William Smith. (See enclosed 
letter.) 
The exhibit attached to Summers' charge is dated December 
9, 1988 and is addressed to Mr. Summers. It provides as 
follows: 
•^Section 208.3(b) of the Act requires an employee 
organization to establish and maintain an appropriate agency 
shop fee refund procedure enabling agency fee payers the 
opportunity and procedure to object to the use of agency fees 
"in aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment." 
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Re: Agency Shop Dues Rebate 
Dear Mr. Summers: 
We apologize for the delay in getting 
this letter to you. As per our telephone 
conversation of today, I am sending this 
letter to inform you that we are having a 
Committee meet.ing_on-Agency_.Shop._-Dues. 
Rebate next week (12/12-12/15) and we will 
be sitting down with our lawyers at that 
time. 
We will inform you in writing, of our 
decision from that meeting. 
From the foregoing, Summers* charge may be summarized in 
the following manner. Prior to 1987, Summers alleges, 
Local 282 had a practice of refunding the entire amount of 
agency shop fees deducted during the year following the 
conclusion of the year. Following the conclusion of 1987, 
Summers, during January 1988, requested a refund of his agency 
fees previously paid. Thereafter, he "repeatedly" requested 
payment of the fee, and was informed that a fee refund 
procedure was being developed. No allegation is made that 
Local 282 has ever denied Summers' request for payment of the 
fee. In any event, Summers' last request for payment of the 
fee was answered by letter dated December 9, 1988, issued by a 
representative of Local 282, stating that a response would be 
provided shortly after a committee meeting to be held during 
mid-December. Apparently having received no further 
communication from Local 282, Summers filed the instant charge 
approximately two weeks later. 
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It is our determination that Summers' charge, as outlined 
above, alleges a denial of an agency fee refund for 1987, and 
is timely.-2/ 
To the extent, however, that the charge, as amended, 
seeks-a determination-that—Loca] 2.8.2 Jviolated_the Act by _. 
failing to establish an agency fee refund procedure for 1987 
which meets the requirements of §208.3 of the Act as 
interpreted by this Board and the Courts, we are in accord 
with the Director's determination that the charge is untimely, 
since, as pointed out by the Director, Summers knew from the 
beginning of 1987 that no such agency fee refund procedure was 
in place. Having failed to file a charge within four months 
of having learned that no §208.3 procedure had been 
established for 1987, the charge, to the extent that it makes 
this allegation, was properly dismissed as untimely. 
We now turn to the issue of Summers' claim that he was 
improperly denied membership in Local 282. The Director 
dismissed this aspect of the charge on the ground that it 
alleges only a denial of membership upon the ground of 
"monetary considerations". Summers was placed on written 
3/ln this regard we construe the alleged practice of 
Local 282 of making an end of year refund payment of the 
entire agency fee collected to be its "procedure," and the 
failure to issue payment pursuant to its procedure to 
constitute the violation of the Act alleged. 
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notice of the Director's opinion that the charge, as framed, 
was deficient because it failed to make allegations which, if 
proven, would establish a violation of the Act, and he was 
given an opportunity to amend or clarify the charge. Summers' 
clarification.-.or--amendment-.Jji-±his_xeg.ax<l._alleges_.as_._£ollows.: 
The Union has denied me the right to join 
and participate in their organization. 
(Section 202 The Taylor Law) 
Based upon these allegations, the Director determined that the 
charge was deficient, and dismissed it accordingly. 
In his exceptions to the dismissal of this aspect of his 
charge, Summers asserts, for the first time, not that 
"monetary considerations" prompted Local 282's denial of 
membership to him, but that membership was denied "based on 
statements [Summers] has made in regard to racism in the 
Buffalo Fire Department in the past." This allegation is not, 
however, properly before us at this time, because we are 
limited in this case to review of the record upon which the 
Director based his determination. 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this 
charge, insofar as it alleges a failure to refund agency fees 
paid by Summers in 1987, is remanded to the Director for 
further proceedings consistent herewith, and, IT IS FURTHER 
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ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in all 
other respects. 
DATED: July 11, 1989 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman, Chairman ' H ld R. 
Walter L. 
#2D-7/ll/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAIRMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF SEWANHAKA 
DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
SOLLEDER & SOLLEDER, ESQS. (GEORGE J. SOLLEDER, JR., 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
DOUGLAS E. LIBBY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Chairmen's Association of Sewanhaka District 
(Association) excepts to the dismissal by the .Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) of 
its improper practice charge, as deficient, against the 
Sewanhaka Central High School District (District). The 
charge alleges that the District violated §§209-1.1(a), (c) 
and (d) of the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when its Board of Education repudiated the parties' 1986-1990 
collective bargaining agreement by refusing to conduct a 
third-stage grievance hearing in connection with a grievance 
challenging a performance evaluation filed by a unit member. 
The charge alleges, in essence, that the District 
repudiated its agreement with the Association, in violation 
CASE NO. U-10688 
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of the Act, by its refusal to conduct a hearing mandated by 
the grievance procedure negotiated by the parties. 
The Association asserts that, notwithstanding the fact 
that the charge alleges a single occasion of refusal to 
conduct a hearing pursuant to the parties' grievance 
procedure, the District's action amounts to a repudiation of 
the agreement violative of the Act in keeping with the 
decision of this Board in Addison CSD, 17 PERB fl3076 (1984). 
In that case, the ALT made a finding, affirmed by this Board, 
that "The District arbitrarily abandoned any semblance of 
compliance with [the parties' grievance] procedures". (17 
PERB f4566, at 4629 [1984]). Indeed, at footnote 2, the ALT 
took administrative notice of arbitration awards which found 
the District to have "flagrantly violated the contract", and 
found its action to be "part of a disturbing pattern of 
ignoring clear contractual directives . . . which showed a 
contempt by the District for the grievance process" and "were 
part of a deliberate pattern to ignore the District's 
contractual responsibilities." These findings, relied upon 
in part by the ALT, together with findings of other 
violations of the Act, led the ALT to conclude, at 4 630, that 
The District's reckless, undefended 
and indefensible actions, wholly ignoring 
a quintessential aspect of the collective 
bargaining agreement and negating its 
existence constitutes a deliberate 
interference and restraint upon employee 
rights guaranteed by §202 of the Act, 
particularly when considered together 
"^  
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with its other violations described 
below. History, too, supports this 
conclusion, the PERB having made note 'of 
the atmosphere of hostility and distrust 
in which the parties have conducted their 
labor relations.' Addison CSD, 13 PERB 
f3060, p. 3102 (1980). 
We__agree with_ th^ 
allegations contained in the instant charge fall far short of 
the type of conduct previously found by this Board to have 
constituted a repudiation of a collective bargaining 
agreement necessary to set forth a cognizable claim of 
violation of the Act. The instant charge seeks nothing more 
than enforcement of the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement, under circumstances in which a disagreement 
between the parties exists as to whether the grievance for 
which a hearing is sought is in fact covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement. Section 2 05.5(d) of the Act 
provides that "The board shall not have authority to enforce 
an agreement between an employer and an employee organization 
and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation 
of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper employer or employee organization practice.11 We 
agree with the Director's determination that the violation of 
the agreement alleged herein would not otherwise constitute 
an improper employer practice, because it fails to allege 
facts sufficient to support a claim of repudiation of the 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties and 
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therefore fails to establish willful interference with 
protected employee organization rights. 
The decision of the Director is affirmed, and IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its_ entirety... 
DATED: July 11, 1989 
Albany, New York 
4^^^/^C, 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2E-7/ll/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AGNES M. QUARTARONE, et al, 
Petitioners, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3506 
TOWN OF RAMAPO HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
TOWN OF RAMAPO HOUSING AUTHORITY UNIT OF 
THE ROCKLAND COUNTY LOCAL 844 OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
AGNES M. QUARTARONE, for Petitioners 
MARIAN E. CAWLEY, for Employer 
GLENN H. BLACKMAN, for Intervenor 
BOARD ORDER 
On June 7, 1989, the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation issued a decision in the above matter finding 
that the petition filed by Agnes M. Quartarone, et al, to 
decertify the Town of Ramapo Housing Authority Unit of the 
Rockland County Local 844 of the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. as negotiating representative for certain 
employees of the Town of Ramapo Housing Authority (employer) 
should be granted for lack of opposition.^/ No exceptions have 
been filed to the decision. 
1/ 22 PERB f4028 (1989). 
Case No. - C-3506 page 2 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Town of Ramapo Housing 
Authority Unit of the Rockland County Local 844 of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating representative of the following 
unit of employees of the employer: 
Included:^ All employees of.. the_employer_ including ..the__. 
following titles: Assistant Maintenance Mechanic: 
Maintenance Mechanic: Maintenance Helper: 
Account Clerk-Typist: Senior Account Clerk-
Typist, Senior Clerk-Typist. 
Excluded: Secretary to Authority/Executive Director. 
DATED: July 11, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
U^MJC^ Z. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
